This paper documents the importance of studying the indirect effects of OSHA and EPA regulations --the competitive advantages which arise from the asymmetrical distributions of regulatory impact among different types of firms. We argue that if the competitive advantage gained through indirect effects is sufficiently large, it can more than offset any direct costs producing a net benefit for the regulated firm and its workers. The indirect effects of OSHA and EPA regulations arise in two ways. The first source is compliance asymmetries, whereby one firm suffers a greater cost burden even when regulations are evenly enforced across firms. The second source is enforcement asymmetry, whereby regulations are more vigorously enforced against certain firms. Earlier research shows that these asymmetries do exist and are based on firm size, unionization, and regional location. In this paper we empirically document that the indirect effects produced by these asymmetries mitigate the direct costs of regulations for many firms. Large, unionized firms in the Frostbelt are clearly gaining wealth at the expense of small, nonunionized firms in the Sunbelt.
I. Introduction
A common error in popular expressions of political economy is the presumption that all firms oppose environmental and safety regulations because these edicts raise business costs. The flaw in this presumption arises from an exclusive focus on what we will call the "direct effects" of regulation --the isolated, partial equilibrium impacts of regulation on single firms or individuals.' Examples of the direct effects of environmental and safety regulations include increased safety of products and workplaces, decreased emissions of pollutants, and increased manufacturing costs. While direct effects dominate popular perceptions of regulation, the often pronounced heterogeneity among firms gives rise to additional, general equilibrium impacts we will call "indirect effects" --the competitive advantages which arise from the asymmetrical distributions of regulatory impact among different groups of firms and workers.
For example, if the cost burden of certain regulations falls heavily on one group of firms and lightly on a second group, then an indirect effect of these regulations is to provide cost advantage to the second group of firms. It is extremely important to recognize that for many firms and workers the indirect effects of regulation can outweigh, in terms of economic importance, the direct effects. If the competitive advantage gained through indirect effects is sufficiently large, it can more than offset any direct costs, producing a net benefit for the regulated firm and its workers. The CPSC swimming pooi slide standard, new source 'For a more extensive discussion of the direct and indirect effects of regulation, see Bartel and Thomas (1985) . standards of the Clean Air Act, and the OSHA cotton dust standard are among the many regulations where indirect effects have been shown to predominate.2
As Salop (1981) and others have pointed out, activities which raise rivals' costs are, in fact, predatory in many circumstances. The three conditions necessary for activities to be regarded as predation are: competitor damage, predator benefit, and consumer damage. The first condition, competitor damage, is very likely to be satisfied by OSHA and EPA regulations. The national cost of industrial compliance with these regulations was $3.7 billion for OSHA and $7.7 billion for EPA in 1976 (Weidenbaum and DeFina, 1978) and mounting evidence (discussed below) indicates that this cost burden is asymmetrically distributed among various types of firms.3 As regards the second condition, predator benefit, particular groups of firms may well be sufficiently advantaged from indirect effects of regulation to experience increased profits (or wages, or both). The question of whether certain firms actually benefit from EPA and OSIIA regulations is an empirical issue, and is the focus of this paper. Herein, we econometrically estimate the nature and extent of regulatory impact on industry wages and profits in the manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy.
In a narrow sense, the third condition for predation, consumer damage, is also extremely likely to be satisfied by EPA and OSHA regulathe CPSC, see Viscusi (1984) ; on EPA, see Crandall (1983) ; and on OSHA, see Haloney and McCormick (1982) .
3As Salop and Scheffman (1983) note, there are economic conditions under which these regulatory cost burdens need not damage competitors. Competitor damage is thus an empirical issue.
tions. The cost increases and productivity decreases of these regulations raise prices for immediate consumers and reduce consumer surplus.4
From a broader, and probably more correct perspective, however, for U.S. environmental and workplace safety regulations to entail "consumer damage,tt these regulations would need to fail a broad test of social cost-benefit. No such tests of the overall impact of these regulations is attempted in this paper, and thus in a strict sense, our argument that these regulations are predatory is incomplete. Nonetheless, a wide range of recent studies of OSHA and EPA have concluded that the actual benefits of these regulations are quite limited.5'6
In the next section, we discuss the impact of indirect effects of regulation on profits and wages and show how the first two conditions for predation, competitor damage and predator benefit, may be satisfied by the enforcement of OSHA and EPA regulations. Section III describes the empirical specifications and data sources used to test the hypotheses regarding indirect effects. The results presented in Section IV document the transfer of wealth between firms that occurs through the enforcement of OSHA and EPA regulations. Conclusions appear in Section V.
4Salop and Scheffrin also argue that there are some cases where in fact consumer surplus may rise after rivals' costs are raised. 50n OSHA, see DiPietro (1976) , Mendeloff (1976) , Smith (1976) , Viscusi (1979) , and Bartel and Thomas (1985) . On EPA, see Lave and Omenn (1981) and Crandall (1983) .
6Consumer damage is usually the most problematic of the three conditions. For example, the recently dismissed antitrust case against IBM contained several controversial allegations of predation against the computer company. Perhaps an appropriate view is that EPA and OSHA are at least as predatory as IBN and other industrial corporations.
II. Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation
Indirect effects of regulation arise from two possible sources:: a "compliance asymmetry" whereby one firm suffers a greater cost burden per unit of output even when regulations are equally enforced across firms, or an "enforcement asymmetry" whereby regulations are more vigorously enforced against certain firms. There appear to be three principal sources of compliance asymmetries due to environmental and safety regulations. First, to the extent that there are economies of scale in compliance, then smaller firms suffer a larger unit-cost impact and in fact may be sufficiently disadvantaged as to exit the industry. Pashigian (1984) has provided evidence of economies of scale in compliance with EPA regulations, Neumann and Nelson (1982) have documented the exit of small mines resulting from enforcement of the 1969 Coal 1ine
Health and Safety Act, and we have previously documented the strong economies of scale that occur in manufacturing for compliance with OSHA regulations (Bartel and Thomas, 1985) . Second, to the extent that unionized firms exhibit higher pre-regulation safety levels, enforcement of occupational safety regulations can benefit unionized firms by forcing non-union competitors to match union-dictated safety levels. Regulation can thus reduce competitive pressure on unionized firms and workers, transferring wealth to these firms and workers from the non-unionized segment of the industry. Third, both because their plants tend to be older and smaller, firms located in Northern and Midwestern states (the Frostbelt) will tend to have higher compliance costs with OSHA and EPA regulations than firms in Southern and Western States (the Sunbelt), when these regulations are evenly enforced.
The second source of indirect effects, enforcement asymmetries, arises from administration of environmental and safety regulations that are systematically skewed against particular groups of firms or workers, and thus induce (or aggravate) competitive advantage for these particular groups. As regards OSHA, our own earlier study (Bartel and Thomas, 1985) exposed more intensive enforcement (per worker) against small and nonunion firms by the agency. To test for regional enforcement asymmetries by OSHA, we reran regression analyses from our earlier study now including a variable measuring industrial regional location. These new results are reported in an appendix to this essay and confirm that OSHA enforcement is more intensive against Sunbelt firms. As regards EPA, the environmental regulations themselves are notoriously riddled with enforcement asymmetries. Especially significant are requirements that new plants meet tighter standards than old plants, and that plants in areas of the country that are cleaner than national standards must meet tighter standards than plants in dirty areas (Crandall, 1983) . Both these enforcement asymmetries burden Sunbelt plants, raising their costs against their Frostbelt counterparts.
Compliance and enforcement asymmetries are thus probably reinforcing in the case of plant size and workforce unionization, with large and unionized plants favored. These asymmetries are, however, offsetting as regards regional impact. Note that if regional enforcement asymmetries are pronounced enough to dominate regional compliance asymmetries, then Frostbelt firms will be advantaged through regulation.
The impact of EPA and OSHA on industry total rents may thus be positive or negative. In terms of direct effects alone, the impacts are, of course, negative --higher regulation-induced production costs generally lower potential rents.7 But if these regulations sufficiently disadvantage small, nonunion, or Sunbelt firms in the industry, then the increase in the industry price that results from the upward shift in the supply curve, may more than offset the regulatory costs for large, unionized, or Frostbelt firms.8 Hence, rents for the industry may actually increase, on average. Figure 1 shows how the impact of regulation on industry rents depends on the firm size distribution in the industry. (Similar diagrams would hold for the percent workforce unionized or for the percent Frostbelt workforce distributions.) It can be seen in Figure 1 that the effects of EPA and OSHA regulations on industrial rents will be most negative for industries comprised exclusively of small firms. As average firm size increases, indirect effects become more significant and the effects of regulation on rents become less negative. Finally, for industries with the largest firms, regulation may well increase total and average industry rents through the exclusion of fringe competitors.
It is important to realize that the impact of regulation on industry rents will be shared between wages and profits because much of the potential increase in windfall profits through regulatory predation may be expropriated by workers. Salinger (1984) has documented this transfer to unionized workers for cross-sectional industry profits, and Moore 7Gray (1984) focused on direct effects when he studied the impact of OS}IA and EPA on productivity.
81n other words, the rents of marginal firms will decline and some may be forced to exit, while the rents of inframarginal firms will rise. For an extended discussion, see Salop and Scheffman (1983) . (1978) and others have documented the abilities of unions to force artificially increased wages for regulated firms enjoying windfall profits. Ignoring wages and examining only corporate profits would potentially severely understate the extent of regulatory impact. Our analysis, therefore, considers the impact of regulation on both profits and wages.
To measure the impact of direct and indirect effects of regulation, we specify the following relationship:
(1) and and these parameters are expected to be positive. Note that if the magnitudes of cr2, a3, and are large enough, then some firms and workers will enjoy increased wages and profits as a result of EPA and OSHA regulations, and predator benefit will also be documented.
In the next section of this paper, we specify equation (1) The profit variable is "return on assets" defined as value added less labor costs, all divided by the value of assets, which is the value of structures and machines. This is also calculated from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. While the industry's "return on assets" is a good proxy for the industry's profits, it suffers several well-known drawbacks. In spite of these problems this measure is used because of its ready availability at a level of aggregation that exactly matches the 9mis time period is chosen because of limited availability of key variables outside the mid-70s. See Bartel and Thomas (1985) were generated by state agencies. Because detailed state data were not available for study, we use only data on federal enforcement of OSHA standards.
To examine the impact of OSHA on workers' wages, we divide the penalty variable by the number of workers in the 22 states for the industry and create PENENPL; the number of workers is estimated from the Census Bureau's Country Business Patterns tapes. When the dependent variable is the return on assets, the denominator of the OSHA variable is changed to the value of assets (PENAST). Since in this case the numerator uses data based on 22 states while the denominator uses national data, we multiply PENAST by the ratio of the number of employees in the nation to the number in the 22 states, in effect, expanding the numerator to a national basis.
For EPA, a good measure of compliance costs is available. Each year, the Census Bureau publishes, for each SIC category, gross pollution abatement operating costs, which cover solid waste collection and disposal, depreciation, labor, equipment leasing, materials and supplies, and payments to governments for public sewage use. '2 Pashigian (1984) has shown that most of the pollution abatement operating costs incurred from 1974 to 1978 can be considered incremental, i.e., induced by the regulatory program. For our analysis of workers' wages, we define a variable PACEMPL which equals gross pollution abatement operating costs in the 12Unfortunately, establishments in SIC Group 23, Apparel and other Textile Products; are excluded from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Expenditures survey because, according to the Census Bureau, these establishments operate primarily in rented quarters where the abatement of pollution is generally arranged by the landlord. Hence, we deleted establishments in that SIC category from our analysis. industry divided by the number of workers in the industry using national data; for analysis of return on assets, we change the denominator to the value of assets and create PACAST. 
III. Results

A. Estimation Technique
The workers' wealth and return on assets equations are each estimated by nonlinear least squares and are specified as follows: Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
B. The Effects of Regulation
In column 1 of each 14Note that quadratic terms on firm size and percent unionized are included in all of our equations. These are added to insure that the regulation interaction terms do not capture possible nonlinearities in the effects of firm size and unionization on wages. In column 2 of Table 2 , we add the regulation-interaction effects to the returns on assets equation.'5 We find strong evidence that unionized firms gain wealth relative to nonunionized firms as a result of the enforcement of OS11A and EPA. Additionally, firms in the Frostbelt benefit relative to those in the Sunbelt, and the effect is very significant. The hypothesized firm size effect, although of the right sign, is extremely weak. In column (3) we consider whether this is due to the hypothesized economies of scale dissipating at very large firm sizes. 15Again, note that quadratic terms on firm size and unionization are included in these equations. See footnote 15.
16Note that in column (3) of Table 1 , we also included an interaction term with the square of firm size, PENSIZE2, but this variable was not significant.
C. Other Variables
The regressions in Tables 1 and 2 
V. Conclusions
This paper has documented the importance of studying the indirect effects of OSHA and EPA regulations --the competitive advantages which arise from the asymmetrical distributions of regulatory impact among different types of firms. We have argued that if the competitive advantage gained through indirect effects is sufficiently large, it can more 17me insignificant effect of UNION Is due to the inclusion of IJNSQ. When UNSQ is deleted, UNION is positive and significant in all columns of Table 1. than offset any direct costs producing a net benefit for the regulated firm and its workers. The indirect effects of OSIiA and EPA regulations arise in two ways. The first source is compliance asymmetries, whereby one firm suffers a greater cost burden even when regulations are evenly enforced across firms. The second source is enforcement asymmetry, whereby regulations are more vigorously enforced against certain finns.
Earlier research has shown that these asymmetries do exist and are based on firm size, unionization, and regional location. In this paper, we have empirically documented that the indirect effects produced by these asymmetries mitigate the direct costs of regulation for many firms.
Large, unionized firms in the Frostbelt are clearly gaining wealth at the expense of small, nonunionized firms in the Sunbelt. While the estimated regulation-interaction effects were significant in Tables 1 and 2, the t-values by themselves do not indicate the magnitude of the wealth transfer. We show this in Table 3 where we evaluate the derivatives of regulation in both the wage and profit equations. The effect is estimated by letting firm size, unionization and the Frostbelt employment share each take on, in turn, a value of zero, the mean, the median or the maximum, while the other two variables are set to equal to their means.
This exercise enables us to determine the relative importance of the indirect effects created by each of the variables. The findings in Table   3 show that workers in large, unionized firms in industries that have a With this caveat in mind, we feel that our findings are extremely provocative. We have shown that regulation has become a predatory device that can be utilized to enhance the wealth of those firms that are best able to comply and to reduce the wealth of rivals who suffer higher regulatory cost burdens. Discussions about regulatory reform or deregulation obviously need to incorporate this model of regulation in order to accurately evaluate the impact of any proposed changes.
'8The mean of wage is 101.9 in 1972 dollars. The mean of ROA is .8706, which is so large because of several corporate expenses (including capital costs, advertising, research, etc.) that are not deducted from the numerator but rather are controlled for by independent variables. The mean of PENEMPL is .382 and of PENAST is .344. 
APPENDIX
In the absence of existing studies of regional enforcement asymmetries by OSI{A, we elected to reestimate regression equations from an earlier study (Bartel & Thomas, 1985) . 
